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Abstract 
The growing number of voluntary standards for governing transnational arenas is presenting 
standards organizations with a problem. While claiming that they are pursuing shared, 
overarching objectives, at the same time, they are promoting their own respective standards 
that are increasingly similar. By developing the notion of ‘standards markets,’ this paper 
examines this tension and studies how different social movement and industry-driven 
standards organizations compete as well as collaborate over governance in transnational 
arenas. Based on an in-depth case study of sustainability standards in the global coffee 
industry, we find that the ongoing co-existence of multiple standards is being promoted by 
the interplay between two countervailing mechanisms: convergence and differentiation. In 
conjunction, these mechanisms are enabling the emergence and persistence of a market for 
standards through what we describe as meta-standardization of sustainable practices. Meta-
standardization leads to convergence at the ‘rules of the game’ level, but allows also 
differentiation at the attributes level, which is enabling parties to create and maintain their 
own standards. Our study helps to advance the understanding of transnational governance by 
explaining the dynamics of competing and collaborating non-state actors in constituting a 
standards market. 
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Introduction 
In the absence of intergovernmental regulation, voluntary standards have proliferated to 
address the challenges of sustainability in global value chains (Bernstein & Cashore, 2007). 
Often, multiple overlapping standards, developed by both social movement organizations and 
firms, co-exist and compete for adopters in the same sector despite being similar in design, 
content and intentions to regulate the transnational arena. Examples can be found in a range 
of fields, including coffee, cocoa, and many other agricultural, horticultural, forestry and 
textile products (Bartley, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2008). 
Although standards organizations claim to have an overarching objective of promoting 
sustainability, several observers criticize them for not consolidating standards setting efforts. 
Poor coordination, duplicated activity, increased certification costs and consumer confusion 
have led to the perception that parallel standards fail to provide an efficient and equitable 
means of promoting sustainability within global value chains (Fransen, 2011). We investigate 
in more detail how private standards organizations have maintained a discretionary space for 
the co-existence of multiple, partly similar, yet competing sustainability standards.  
Specifically, we examine the dynamics that sustain multiple standards to exist in the global 
coffee industry. With several different standards promoted by both social movements and 
industry, the sustainable coffee sector provides an illuminating case for theory building. 
Using a problem-driven approach (Davis and Marquis, 2005), we identify the social 
mechanisms, convergence and differentiation, that work in parallel to stimulate a process we 
call meta-standardization. Whereas the notion of ‘standardization’ typically assumes 
consolidation of practices and norms into a uniform standard (Timmermans & Epstein, 
2010), ‘meta-standardization’ allows for ongoing standards multiplicity. ‘Meta-
standardization’ means that convergence happens at the level of core criteria and overarching 
principles (‘rules of the game’), whereas variety remains at the level of specialized attributes 
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allowing standards setters to maintain their own identities. This dynamic promotes the 
emergence and persistence of a ‘standards market,’ in which standards setters both 
collaborate and compete for standards adoption.  
Our findings primarily contribute to work on transnational governance research and 
multiplicity of standards (Kolk, 2005; Rasche, 2010; Fransen, 2011). The concept of 
‘standards markets’ provides a novel way of thinking about transnational governance 
processes, highlighting competitive and collaborative dynamics among non-state governance 
organizations. We offer the notion of ‘meta-standardization,’ showing how the tension 
between market competition and shared norms can influence the standardization process. We 
thereby inform the debate on whether standards multiplicity leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ or 
‘healthy competition,’ driving private rule-setters ‘to continually innovate, and, in fact, 
increase their effectiveness’ (SAN, 2011). By analyzing a new market form based on the 
tension between market competition and shared, substantive objectives, the article further 
contributes to our understanding of the emergence of other socially driven, ‘moral’ markets 
(Biggart & Delbridge, 2004), e.g. ethical finance. 
Studying the development and interaction of parallel standards over time as an inductive case 
(Yin, 2003) helps identify more general mechanisms underlying the co-existence of multiple 
social standards in related fields. So, although we examine the case of the sustainable coffee 
industry, the mechanisms identified and the framework proposed can be useful in 
understanding competitive markets for private governance forms within and beyond the 
context of sustainable trade and production systems.  
Next we review the literature, describe the data collection and analysis, and present the case. 
Finally we develop and discuss a conceptual framework that describes the dynamics of 
standards markets.  
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Theoretical and Problem-Driven Motivation 
Transnational Governance and Competing Standards  
Transnational governance is attracting growing scholarly attention. The creation of 
transnational rule-making is argued to be a messy process of competing principles, with a 
complex web of actors in which no single actor is dominant (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; 
Bartley, 2007). Some scholars focus on the role of state actors, examining how regulatory 
institutions emerge in transnational arenas, e.g. the Stockholm Convention (Maguire & 
Hardy, 2006) and the Kyoto Protocol (Wijen & Ansari, 2007). Others examine the role of 
non-state actors in the emergence of voluntary standards for governing transnational arenas, 
e.g. forestry and textiles (Bartley, 2007). Voluntary standards setting is regarded as ‘a process 
in which non-state actors from more than one country generate behavioral prescriptions that 
are intended to apply across national borders’ (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009, p. 711), thereby 
filling the regulatory gap left by weak states (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2000; Djelic & Sahlin-
Andersson, 2006). Importantly, voluntary standards differ from transnational laws and 
regulations because rule-making power is not derived from sovereign authority (Bernstein & 
Cashore, 2007). Standards adoption is based on decisions of individual market participants. 
Yet, despite lacking a central enforcement authority, standards can have law-like effects 
(Terlaak, 2007) and become binding and enforceable rules through independent, third-party 
certification systems such as ISO 9000 (Guler, Guillén & Macpherson, 2002).  
In the absence of an overarching regulatory body, several parties may promote their own 
standards to address the same issues. However, the mechanisms promoting the co-existence 
of multiple standards in transnational arenas are not clear. To be sure, research in technology 
and innovation studies identifies a number of mechanisms – increasing returns to learning 
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(David, 1985), network externalities (Arthur, 1989; Katz & Shapiro, 1986) and switching 
costs (Greenstein, 1997) – to explain why a particular standard becomes dominant or not in 
the presence of alternatives.  
This dynamic is well-understood for technical standards, but less so for socially-oriented 
standards, i.e. norms addressing ethical behaviour, human rights and responsibility or 
sustainability. Socially-oriented standards have certain characteristics that suggest that 
different mechanisms may be driving the dynamics of standardization processes. Most 
importantly, there is an important political and normative dimension to socially oriented 
standards, i.e. their existence may be justified – at least rhetorically – in terms of public 
policy objectives. Also, concepts such as ethics, social justice and fairness are often 
ambiguous and contentious leading to ongoing re-negotiation (Reinecke, 2010). 
These observations are particularly relevant in the area of sustainability, whose ambiguity 
and contested nature has been promoting the emergence and parallel existence of multiple 
standards to define sustainable practices.  
The multiplicity of sustainability standards 
A sustainability standard can be defined as a set of ‘voluntary predefined rules, procedures, 
and methods to systematically assess, measure, audit and/or communicate the social and 
environmental behavior and/or performance of firms’ (Gilbert, Rasche & Waddock, 2011, p. 
24). Scholars show that social movements create standards leading to new ‘sustainable’ 
markets for certified products, such as grass-fed beef (Weber, Heinze & DeSoucey, 2008), 
organic food (Lee, 2009) and sustainable coffee (Kolk, 2005). Yet, as these ‘sustainable’ 
product markets evolve and mature, they become increasingly fragmented as other social 
movement- and industry-driven standards providers enter the market with their own versions 
of sustainability standards. Consequently, sustainable product markets are highly contested 
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arenas marked by disputes around the definition of ‘sustainability’ and, often, the co-
existence of multiple standards, for example in forestry (Sasser, Prakash, Cashore & Auld, 
2006), flowers (Riisgaard, 2009) and textiles (Fransen, 2011).  
Studies show that these different standards schemes have surprisingly similar goals and are 
‘remarkably similar in their organizational design, processes and rhetoric’ (Dingwerth & 
Pattberg, 2009, p. 708). While standards should communicate information about how goods 
are produced, processed and traded, ‘business, government and many others [are concerned] 
that the amount of standards are proliferating to a degree where it is getting confusing’ 
(ISEAL, 2010a) for both consumers (Mueller, Santos & Seuring, 2009) and companies 
(Jamali, 2010). In addition, multiple certifications incur increased costs for producers who 
adopt multiple standards to meet the demands of buyers (Mutersbaugh, 2005).  
Thus, multiple standards are seen as an inefficient way to ‘organize’ a cost-effective, well-
coordinated and equitable solution to the global challenge of sustainable production (Bitzer, 
Francken & Glasbergen, 2008). Yet, the ongoing multiplicity of sustainability standards has 
received very little research attention (Fransen, 2011). Specifically, little is known about how 
different standards setters manage the tension between competing for standards adopters and 
their joint objective of making global production systems more sustainable.  
 
The Market for Sustainable Coffee  
Coffee is widely regarded as a pioneering industry for sustainability certification. The United 
Nations 2005 World Summit defined sustainable development as the long-term prosperity of 
businesses alongside the ecological and social systems in which economic activity is 
embedded: in other words, the triple bottom line of economic prosperity, environmental 
quality and social equity.  
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Coffee ranks as the world’s second most traded commodity in volume and trade. An 
estimated 25 million people around the world depend directly on coffee farming for their 
livelihoods. Two thirds of them are smallholders, with limited market power vis-a-vis a 
highly concentrated group of international buyers and facing highly volatile coffee prices 
(Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). 
A combination of factors triggered the emergence of non-state standards for sustainable 
coffee production: liberalization of the coffee market as a result of the dismantling of the 
International Coffee Agreement in 1989; state withdrawal from export and marketing 
activities in developing countries; shift in power from producing countries towards 
corporations in buying countries; increasing importance of food safety; and civil society 
actors’ campaigns (e.g. Kolk, 2005).  
Since 2000, certifications have grown by around 20% annually, establishing a growing, yet 
increasingly fragmented, market segment for sustainable coffee (see Figure 1). In 2009, 
global sales of sustainable coffee were an estimated 8% of all green (non-roasted) coffee 
exported worldwide, and in the Netherlands and US, it comprised 40% and 16% respectively 
(Pierrot & Giovannucci, 2010).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1, Figure 1 Here 
--------------------------------- 
Standards for sustainable coffee differ in terms of market volume, historical roots and 
sponsors, price premiums for farmers, and implementation systems (see Table 1). Organic 
(1978), Fairtrade (1988), SAN/Rainforest Alliance (1995) and Bird Friendly (1996/7) 
standards were created by social and environmental movement organizations. Fierce battles 
and campaigns by activists and consumers against well-known coffee brands (Conroy 2007) 
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made sustainability a concern for many mainstream operators. In the late 1990s, coffee 
roasters began adopting social movement-driven standards and using them to market their 
brands. But they also developed their own standards. UTZ Certified (1997), Nespresso AAA 
Sustainable Quality (2003) and Starbucks C.A.F.E. Practices (2004) were co-founded by 
private firms, often in collaboration with or modeled on social movement standards. These 
standards typically pursue more business-related objectives, such as traceability, and product 
quality. The Common Code for the Coffee Community (4C), a sector-spanning membership 
association, was founded in 2006 as the mainstream solution to global industry self-
regulation (Manning & Von Hagen, 2010). Illustrating the ongoing growth of this sector, 
Illycaffè and the Norwegian certifier DNV (2011) developed a new “Responsible Supply 
Chain Process” standard for coffee.  
 
Methods 
In line with the inductive, problem-driven focus of this study, we employ a qualitative case 
study approach to identify the mechanisms driving the co-existence of partially similar, but 
competing sustainability standards. Qualitative case studies are suited to analyze empirical 
phenomena that are multi-faceted and complex. The analytical emphasis is on social 
processes (Langley, 1999). Closeness to and immersion in rich data in a focused analysis of a 
particular sector enables us to ‘get much closer to theoretical constructs’ (Siggelkow, 2007, p. 
22).  
Data sources 
Our core data are 40 semi-structured interviews with participants and stakeholders in the 
sustainable coffee market. Interviews were conducted in 2006-7 and 2009-10, with staff 
members of standards organizations, particularly Fairtrade, the SAN/Rainforest Alliance and 
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4C. We also interviewed independent consultants, representatives of industry, government, 
developmental agencies and producer organizations. We identified interviewees using 
snowball sampling techniques, starting with existing contacts. Interviewees were then 
selected based on involvement in the standards development process. Interviews focused on 
the history of standards organizations, objectives, positioning strategies and views on 
competition between standards and future market trends. Most interviewees had strong 
personal interests in our research question and considered multiplicity an increasing problem. 
Interviews lasted 75 minutes on average. All but three interviews were transcribed verbatim.  
Interview data were complemented by archival data and personal observations in industry 
meetings. We gathered publicly available information from standards setters, research 
institutions, coffee roasters, retailers and media websites and systematically searched annual 
reports, press releases, industry statistics and reports, standards documents, journal 
publications and a number of benchmarking studies.  
Data analysis 
Our analysis proceeded in three steps. First, we traced the historical development of 
individual standards, analyzing their objectives and compliance criteria. We then compared 
standards along various dimensions based on interviews, observations, websites, standards 
documents and existing benchmarking studies. Second, we focused on how standards were 
shaped through interactions among promoters. Accordingly, we conducted an inductive 
analysis of interviews and written material focusing on the co-existence of parallel standards 
over time. We coded and clustered interview data to identify how different standards 
organizations perceived and positioned themselves vis-a-vis each other.  
To facilitate the third, most challenging step of the analysis, and to balance the need for rich 
description and theory development in our problem-driven work, we followed the 
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recommendation of Davis and Marquis (2005; see also Pajunen, 2008; Gross, 2009) to use 
mechanism-based theorizing. A mechanism can be defined as ‘a set of interacting parts – an 
assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one of them’ (Hernes, 1998, p. 
74, cited in Davis & Marquis, 2007, p. 336). These authors suggest that mechanisms can 
provide revealing explanations for complex social phenomena. They are not ‘universal laws’ 
that predict relations between variables, but ‘propensities to act’ that describe how relations 
and interactions form a ‘wheelwork producing a social outcome’ (Davis & Marquis, 2005, p. 
337), here the emergence of a standards market.  
To identify those interaction mechanisms, each researcher individually identified specific 
processes and connections that structured the relations among standards organizations. After 
several iterations and comparisons among the authors, we identified two interdependent 
mechanisms underlying the co-existence of multiple standards over time: convergence on 
objectives and certification practices, and differentiation of distinctive features, target groups 
and stringency levels. We then focused on uncovering the processes driving convergence and 
differentiation. For example, we found that one way that organizations align standards 
criteria is through the adoption of industry-level codes of good practice. We found that 
convergence and differentiation do not act in isolation, but in a continuous interplay 
promoting a standards market; we try to capture the social outcome of this dynamic with the 
term ‘meta-standardization.’ 
We developed a general model describing the dynamics of standards markets, which, aimed 
at ‘analytical generalization’ (Yin, 2003), may explain propensities to act that can be 
observed in other sectors.  
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The Constitution of a Standards Market for Sustainable Coffee 
The co-existence of multiple standards for sustainable coffee can be perceived as paradoxical. 
Standards ‘share the goal of transforming the world's production systems and value chains to 
make them more sustainable’ (SAN, 2011), but there is fierce competition over market share 
rather than collaboration to achieve this objective. An interviewee from FLO-CERT 
described it as ‘Suddenly we are confronted with all this competition.’ 
On the one hand, standards setters present themselves as collaborators, sharing the same 
political agenda and working towards promotion of sustainable development. An informant 
from FLO commented, ‘I think it is a shame that we’re fighting against each other. We 
should all be fighting for the same goal, to have a more fair and sustainable trading system 
world wide.’ 
On the other hand, ‘standards compete just like companies and they invest a lot of money in 
marketing those standards - just like a brand,’ an interviewee from a development agency 
noted. Looking for reasons, a Fairtrade interviewee admitted that providers have an interest in 
self-preservation, autonomy, and increased market share: 
‘It is an interesting situation…on one level […] we are all sharing the same agenda: 
[…] progress towards sustainable development. […] So the difficulty is, are we 
competing with Rainforest? And is Utz competing with Rainforest? Well, on one 
level, yes, because we’re all pitching for companies’ business, we all want to grow 
our own label.’ 
A joint statement from the executive directors of the three main sustainability standards 
initiatives, Fairtrade, SAN/Rainforest Alliance and Utz Kapeh, encapsulates the nature of 
their competitive and collaborative co-existence: ‘We accept that there is market competition 
between us, not least because we are different and, as long as this is healthy competition, we 
welcome it’ (SAN, 2011). This has resulted in a competitive market space whose existence is 
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largely accepted by participants. We call these social spaces ‘standards markets’. 
Next, we analyze the mechanisms that have contributed to the emergence of a standards 
market and how participants have managed the tension between promoting a common 
objective, while maintaining their own identities.   
 
Standards Differentiation  
More or less intentionally, standards setters have created a competitive space within which 
standards can co-exist through differentiation, as a Fairtrade licensee explained: ‘It becomes 
more competitive on the supermarket shelf, and each label wants to say “We are the most 
sustainable. Buy me!” And for that to sustain you need differentiation on the standards side.’ 
Our findings indicate that standards differentiation is driven partly by the interests of firms 
and standards organizations in preserving their autonomy and identity, and partly by claims 
to moral authority over the definition of what a sustainability standard should provide. 
‘Standards have their own objectives and they use their goals to position themselves vis-a-vis 
other standards,’ an industry expert explained. Accordingly, a respondent from the 
mainstream coffee industry framed the need for standards adoption as a matter of ‘choice,’ 
where different consumer demands favour a diversity of standards along different 
dimensions: 
‘Consumers have different demands and different standards respond to this diversity. 
Standards are not necessarily cannibalizing each other. They position themselves in 
the same niche, but not in the same spot.’ 
However, market positioning is not tied solely to ‘consumer demands,’ but reflects different 
ideological roots and philosophies promoting sustainability (see Table 2).  
-----------------------  
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Insert Table 2 Here 
------------------------ 
 
Emphasizing distinctive features of sustainability 
Interviews suggest that standards setters utilize the ambiguity of sustainability in order to 
position themselves vis-a-vis other standards, sometimes through emphasizing particular 
aspects.  
SAN/Rainforest Alliance and Bird Friendly emphasize the environment and focus on 
ecosystem conservation and wildlife protection. Their standards seek to preserve wildlife 
habitats that well-managed coffee farms can provide if the coffee is naturally shaded by the 
leafy canopy of native rainforest trees. Fairtrade, on the other hand, focuses on social issues, 
including the livelihoods of small farmers and their communities, and access to health care 
and education. Most standards require compliance with International Labour Organization 
(ILO) conventions, but Fairtrade especially emphasizes payment of a premium to farmers 
adopting the Fairtrade label, and the right of workers to organize for collective bargaining. 
Standards also reflect the economic dimension of sustainability in different ways. Fairtrade 
initially aimed at promoting a ‘different’ market and restructuring the value chain to 
empower producers (Vanderhoff Boersma, 2009). A social movement activist commented 
that, ‘The aim has always been to change trade, to realize a kind of “powershift”, right?’ A 
key element, therefore, is a guaranteed minimum price and premium (US$1.40 + US$0.2 per 
pound for washed Arabica from April 2011). Fairtrade is the only standard requiring buyers 
to provide pre-financing and long-term contracts to promote farmers’ economic development. 
Other standards, especially those driven by private firms, do not share Fairtrade’s primary 
goal of shifting power relations. Instead, they interpret the economic dimension in terms of 
enhanced product quality and traceability as a source of economic benefit and a basis for 
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higher prices to be ‘freely negotiated between the individual buyer and seller’ (4C, 2010). 
However, all these organizations claim to address the economic pillar by focusing on 
improved farm management and increased productivity. 
An SAN/Rainforest Alliance representative notes, ‘People really do believe in their own 
program,’ and explained that:  
‘We’ve got birds [Bird Friendly], we’ve got rainforest protection [SAN/Rainforest 
Alliance], we’ve got sustainability through trade [Organic] and we’ve got traceability 
[UTZ Certified] and support for social development for farmers and protecting 
farmers’ prices [Fairtrade]. Five different perspectives, all valid to some or other 
extent […] because […] I suppose, civil society actors’ work […] tends to be very 
much based on single issue stuff, [so that] single issue politics is that outcome.’ 
This extract shows that standards organizations recognize and accept each others’ agendas, 
but have different focuses as part of a joint development effort.  
 
Targeting different producer groups 
Standards organizations further differentiate themselves by addressing different target groups 
following market positioning principles. For example, in line with its political agenda, 
Fairtrade only targets small-scale coffee producers who are democratically organized, share 
profits equally and ‘run their farm mainly by using their own and their family’s labour.’ An 
FLO representative justified the narrow definition of their target group in terms of impact: 
‘we never will be the biggest as Fairtrade, we want to be the most influential!’ With the 
differing aim of specializing in high quality coffee, Nespresso limits its AAA Sustainable 
Quality™ Program to its own producers that are selected based on coffee quality, stating that 
‘only the top 1 to 2% of the world’s green coffee crop meets Nespresso specific taste and 
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aroma profiles.’ 
Such narrow definitions of target groups provide legitimate ground for other standards 
providers to target ‘mainstream’ producers. Both UTZ Certified and 4C were intentionally 
designed as mainstream sustainability approaches in response to Fairtrade’s policies and 
targeting, in particular. They thus promote their standards to producers of all types and sizes. 
A 4C respondent explained, 4C is ‘as diversified as possible so as to bring many producers in. 
[…] When 4C appeared on the stage, the lion’s share, 95% of the market, was not even 
certifiable.’ 
 
Offering different standards ‘levels’: baseline versus premium standards 
A related strategy is positioning by ‘level’ of certification or what other scholars have called 
‘stringency’ (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005). Standards setters position themselves as either a 
baseline or premium standard both in terms of the proclaimed ‘level’ of standards 
requirements and their implementation.  
4C is at one end of the spectrum where ‘baseline level means that producers exclude worst 
practices and achieve an average level of sustainability as a start.’ 4C seeks to make the 
‘system comparatively easy for producers to enter’ (4C, 2010), e.g. with low entry criteria 
and low joining fees. A 4C representative explained, ‘We are as broad as possible to enable 
as many producers as possible to come in. Our entry criteria are rather low, focusing on 
unacceptable practices, and the next step [is] called continuous improvement. It’s very 
flexible.’ 
Rather than third-party certification, 4C uses verification, which is widely recognized as less 
stringent. 4C promoters, however, see their standard not as an alternative to other standards 
but as a starting point for ‘continuous improvement’ in order to pave the way for a ‘step up’ 
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to certification by ‘more demanding standards’. A 4C representative explained that ‘The 
advantage for farmers, we hope, is that if they have the baseline of 4C then they can build on 
it with the other certification programs.’ Following a similar rationale of assisting in a 
gradual conversion to sustainable production, SAN/Rainforest Alliance allows firms to use 
their label if at least 30% of their coffee is certified. 
Fairtrade, in contrast, claims that it has been ‘Leading the Way’ in the sustainability 
standards movement (FLO, 2010). Beside its unique premium price policy and other trade 
regulations, its third-party certification body was the first, in 2007, to become ISO 65 
accredited, the internationally accepted norm for product certification systems. This is 
reflected in Fairtrade’s position within the hierarchy of sustainability labels. ‘It is a highly 
regarded label; it has a high status and high reputation,’ said a public relations officer at FLO. 
This positioning strategy may generate ‘social legitimacy’ switching costs (Greenstein, 1997) 
which makes it more costly for brands to switch to lower-level standards. 
Standards Convergence  
Differentiation processes are paralleled by convergence tendencies. An industry expert 
observed ‘Standards are occupying niches more and more, but at the same time they are 
becoming more and more similar.’ Next, we explore convergence in more detail (see Table 3) 
and how it has contributed to the emergence and persistence of a ‘standards market.’ 
-----------------------  
Insert Table 3 Here 
------------------------ 
Emergence of a Common Sustainability Vocabulary 
Our findings show that standards setters have mobilized a shared discursive apparatus to 
establish the purposes and identities of their standards, and to achieve legitimacy as players in 
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the standards market.  
With the exception of Organic, which was codified into law in many countries, and Bird 
Friendly, a more stringent Organic standard for shade-grown coffee, all standards refer to 
sustainability in terms of the three pillars of social equity, economic prosperity and 
environmental quality, although the weights assigned to each may vary. This common 
vocabulary was the result of mutual observation and dynamic interaction among standards 
organizations. Over time, they have adopted each other’s sustainability features to address the 
three dimensions. One coffee roaster observed: 
‘When you look at the entire dynamics and history then they have all become more 
and more aligned with each other. For Fairtrade, social criteria used to be the main 
focus; for Rainforest, the environmental criteria stood out. Now you look at what has 
happened over the last 10 to 15 years and there you see much equalization. Fairtrade 
now also has environmental criteria and SAN/Rainforest Alliance now also has the 
social component.’ 
One example of the emergence of a common vocabulary is Fairtrade’s adoption of more 
stringent environmental criteria in 2007 to match competing labels. In response to the rising 
popularity of SAN/Rainforest Alliance and Organic, Fairtrade realized that to be credible, a 
sustainability standard must include the environmental pillar. In turn, Fairtrade’s economic 
principles, especially its minimum price, influenced other standards. UTZ Certified, 
Starbucks and Nespresso publicize the average price premium paid to producers to 
demonstrate the economic benefits of certification. In addition, Nespresso developed a tool to 
calculate ‘Real Farmers’ Income™’ as an innovative way to address economic sustainability 
beyond minimum prices. 
There are also learning effects. Many industry-driven standards were developed with 
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reference to social movement-driven standards. A 4C representative described how standards 
organizations observe and respond to each other:  
‘We developed the standard in dialogue. We looked at the standards of FLO, Organic, 
UTZ Certified, SAN/Rainforest Alliance, Starbuck’s C.A.F.E. Practices… […] and 
sorted them according to economic, social and environmental dimensions […]. And 
then our stakeholders discussed what we considered as really unacceptable practices 
that should be excluded in 4C.’ 
Through mutual observation, standards organizations aligned their criteria with the three 
sustainability pillars, while maintaining their identities, by emphasizing and insisting on 
specialized features.  
 
Creation of Shared ‘Certification Platforms’  
In a joint statement, Fairtrade, SAN/Rainforest Alliance and Utz Certified declared their 
‘respect [for] each other’s mission and the unique focus each brings’ and the ‘complementary 
aspects’ of their diverse standards (SAN, 2011). However, this statement of what Braithwaite 
and Drahos (2000) call ‘mutual recognition’ of each others’ governance efforts is also an 
attempt to protect the collective legitimacy of the industry in the face of 
‘perceived inefficiencies such as increased costs for farmers and confusion for consumers’ 
(SAN, 2011).  
A sustainability consultant explained that ‘this multiplicity of standards is a nightmare for 
producers,’ particularly when they have to adopt more than one label to satisfy the 
requirements of various buyers. As a result, standards organizations have begun to make 
standards elements more compatible. A FLO manager explained how Fairtrade and Organic 
seek to reduce the level of complexity and costs for farmers: 
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‘If not through dual audits, then mutual recognition! So if a producer is Organic 
certified already, we don’t see a need to do an inspection of the environmental aspects 
of the Fairtrade standard. So that helps. That is an incremental piece towards 
harmonization.’  
In 2008, 50% of Fairtrade and 15% of SAN/Rainforest Alliance sales were double-certified 
Organic. Also, Fairtrade collaborated with Starbucks and SAN/Rainforest Alliance 
collaborated with Nespresso’s ‘ecolaboration’ in dual certifications. To encourage adoption, 
4C positioned itself more and more prominently as a collaborator providing an entry-step to 
more stringent standards. As part of their partnership, 4C automatically recognizes producers 
certified by SAN/Rainforest Alliance, and since June 2011, Utz Certified. This is an example 
of standards endorsement through the recognition of common coverage of standards 
elements, becoming the means to align approaches and create synergies among certification 
platforms. 
 
Adoption of Industry-Level Codes of Good Practice 
Standards convergence in terms of governance and implementation has been further re-
enforced by meta-organizations (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2008) and their creation of industry-
level codes of good practice.  
ISO 65 accreditation, developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
is increasingly considered ‘good business practice.’ Fairtrade, UTZ Certified and 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance have all decided to get their certification bodies accredited to signal 
credibility and professionalism. Verification standards (Starbucks, Nespresso, 4C) have 
begun to complement their own standards with external certification by Fairtrade, 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance and UTZ Certified, respectively. 
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The ISEAL Alliance, a global membership association for social and environmental 
standards systems, has developed various codes of good practice to facilitate harmonization. 
ISEAL’s executive director publically justified the need for more collaboration among 
sustainability standards (ISEAL, 2010a): 
‘We cannot continue to have this uncoordinated proliferation of standards systems 
where it is impossible to see the gaps, the overlaps, and where there is no clear 
understanding of how the different kinds of standards fit together. So that is a clear 
challenge facing the standards movement.’  
ISEAL thereby acts as a market watchdog protecting the legitimacy of the sustainability 
standards movement; ‘If consolidation is not reached,’ a representative of ISEAL explained 
in an industry meeting, ‘the entire sustainability standards project has failed.’ 
Being a ‘legitimizing agent’ (Durand & McGuire, 2005), ISEAL membership further endows 
legitimacy to individual standards. ISEAL (2010b) describes its members as ‘leaders in their 
fields, committed to creating solid and credible standard systems.’ Members have to 
recognize formally the ISEAL Alliance ‘Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and 
Environmental Standards.’ This standardizes the process of standards development ‘to 
differentiate credible standards from other claims’ (ISEAL, 2010b). ISEAL thus contributes 
to the convergence of governance systems, for example, by institutionalizing multi-
stakeholder representation and consultation.  
Despite these drivers of convergence, standards continue to reproduce the positions they have 
created in order to maintain their own identities. A sustainability expert reported on a meeting 
facilitated by the World Bank in the early 2000s exploring the possibilities for a joint 
standard: 
‘Discussion showed quickly: there simply is no interest in consolidation, none at all. 
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There are simply too many groups involved – too many interests…Obviously, there is 
no interest in seeing their own standard disappear.’ 
Another informant from the coffee industry explained how corporate-owned standards allow 
firms ‘to leave the backdoor open’ and preserve autonomy: ‘Business practices might be in 
contradiction to standards developed by other entities. This is why corporations would rather 
invent a new standard.’  
Autonomy is also ideologically motivated, which is particularly salient among social 
movement-driven standards organizations. Even if they engaged in collaboration and 
recognized the need to make standards more efficient, they would be reluctant to give up the 
distinct sustainability features of their standards, as this quote from an FLO respondent 
demonstrates:  
‘But if we did consolidate, what would we consolidate on? Hm…? We’re not gonna 
give up on the social movement piece, we’re not gonna give up on the minimum price 
and premium, and there is probably a peak of other things that we wanna see come 
through, so, yeahhh….’  
In sum, even though there are convergence trends, standards setters continue to differentiate 
their standards to preserve their autonomy and/or demonstrate ideological commitment.  
 
Discussion 
This study aimed at achieving a better understanding of the dynamics that sustain multiple 
standards with almost identical policy aims in the transnational arena. From a technical 
standards perspective, multiplicity in the absence of market intervention may not be an 
unexpected outcome (Genschel, 1997). But when standards organizations claim to pursue 
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collective objectives addressing social issues such as poverty, child labour and ecological 
destruction, an investment in ‘standards wars’ rather than a collective, unified solution seems 
a paradoxical outcome. To resolve this puzzle, we adopted a field-level perspective to focus 
on how the tension between market competition and shared objectives plays out in the 
interaction and interrelations among standards organizations.  
The Constitution of Standards Markets 
Following the advice of Davis and Marquis (2005, p. 337) to advance theoretical 
explanations for problem-driven research, we identified the social mechanisms, convergence 
and differentiation, underpinning the co-existence of multiple standards as the ‘wheelwork 
producing a social outcome’, here, a standards market. By standards markets, we mean arenas 
in which standards setters offer different, yet similar and mutually recognized standards that 
are close substitutes. To better understand what constitutes the social mechanisms, or ‘chains 
or aggregations of actors, problem situations, and habitual responses’ (Gross, 2009, p. 369), 
we focused on how interacting processes at the micro-level lead to more or less systematic 
macro-level effects. Based on the case of the coffee industry, we found that standards 
organizations who mutually observe and reciprocally position one another at the micro-level 
tend to engage in certain processes that, at the aggregate level, stimulate convergence and 
differentiation. Figure 2 illustrates the interplay between convergence and differentiation 
promoting the emergence of a standards market.  
-----------------------  
Insert Figure 2 Here 
------------------------ 
Three interacting processes are part of the ‘wheelwork’ promoting standards convergence. 
First, while the concept of sustainability is ambiguous and open to debate, a common 
sustainability vocabulary around the pillars of economic prosperity, environmental quality 
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and social equity has helped ‘narrow’ this concept through learning, imitation and mutual 
borrowing of standards criteria. A common vocabulary was not purposefully driven by a 
single standards setter, but reflects increasing pressure to legitimize individual strategies in 
the face of numerous alternative standards solutions (Deephouse, 1999).  
Second, pressure to reduce the costs incurred by multiple certification schemes and the 
related threat to the collective legitimacy of sustainability standards as a viable solution to 
sustainable production has stimulated mutual recognition of standards and implementation 
systems. Standards providers explicitly or implicitly agree to make their products more 
compatible. Similar to alliances and production platforms in other industries, they create 
shared certification platforms that increase compatibility of technical certification criteria, 
while allowing product differentiation in brands.  
Finally, industry-level codes of good practice, such as ISEAL’s ‘standardization of standards 
setting’ or ISO 65’s ‘certification of certifiers’, may lead to further convergence. This finding 
is in line with previous research on the emergence of norms for accountability and 
participation, such as third-party certification (Gulbrandsen, 2008) or the multi-stakeholder 
model of governance (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2009). 
Although standards setters agree on general objectives and definitions, they continue to 
differentiate themselves in their emphasis on specific features, their targeting of different 
groups of adopters and their positioning as baseline or premium solution. Sustained 
differences make standards markets the site of ongoing contest and concern. Market 
participants thereby actively participate in ongoing field-level debates and negotiation 
processes in which politics, agency and vested interests shape the interpretation of issues 
(Hoffman, 1999).  
Meta-Standardization  
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While the ongoing dynamic of convergence and differentiation is unlikely to lead to a 
consolidation of standards into a single standard, it promotes what we call a ‘meta-
standardization’ of sustainability standards. Meta-standardization is an important element in 
explaining why a market for standards might emerge and sustain. A market, by definition, 
implies the co-existence of multiple offerings. Yet making these offerings understandable to 
audiences is a collective process that requires the creation of a recognizable category as a 
source of collective identity (Navis & Glynn, 2010). To be recognized as legitimate, market 
participants must strike a balance between differentiation and agreement about product 
commonalities (Carruthers & Stinchcombe, 1999; Navis & Glynn, 2010) and conformity with 
rules and practices (Deephouse, 1999). The mechanisms of convergence and differentiation 
hence have been found to support the emergence and reproduction of other markets and fields 
(e.g. De Clercq & Voronov 2009; King, Clemens & Fry, 2011). Due to convergence, 
standards elements become partially ‘standardized’ at higher order, ‘rules of the game’ level, 
yet they vary at lower order level of specialized attributes, preventing full consolidation into a 
single standard. This allows standards setters to maintain their individuated identities and 
develop distinct solutions to promoting sustainability. 
Meta-standardization thereby regulates competition by making individual standards 
responsive to emerging shared objectives, even in the absence of a central regulatory body. 
As standards setters converge over a certain normative understanding of core criteria and 
overarching principles of what sustainability standards should achieve, meta-standardization 
sets limits to what counts as legitimate and recognized solutions to the problem of 
‘unsustainable’ production. But rather than creating fixed codes of behaviour (Terlaak, 2007), 
meta-standardization is an ongoing process, aimed at a ‘moving target,’ in which standards 
elements might be added or dropped over time, with the meaning of concepts and practices 
remaining in flux. Since standards setters also compete for conceptual ownership about what 
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‘sustainability’ should be, the concept of ‘sustainability standard’ is not static, but is shaped 
and re-shaped by the continuous interplay of convergence and differentiation.  
In sum, meta-standardization helps individual standards organizations reach common ground 
on key overarching principles and practical templates on how to organize rule-making in the 
transnational arena. Yet, meta-standardization remains an open-ended alignment process that 
provides latitude for differentiation at the attributes level of an individual standard, with 
important implications for transnational governance.  
Contribution to Market Formation Research 
Our findings resonate with research on competitive dynamics in conventional markets. In his 
seminal work, White (1981, p. 518) defines markets as ‘self-reproducing social structures 
among specific cliques of firms and other actors who evolve roles from observations of each 
other’s behavior.’ Roles result from mutual observation and reciprocal positioning strategies, 
such as market segmentation (Porter, 1980; Carrol & Swaminathan, 2000; Dobrev, Kim & 
Hannan, 2001) and status differentiation (Podolny, 1993) that co-create the market space 
within which its participants compete.  
Similar dynamics seem to be at work in standards markets. Standards setters observe and 
position themselves vis-a-vis each other to control their identities in their interaction with 
peers, thereby mutually adapting their sustainability standards. In line with Pfeffer and 
Salancik’s (1978) observation that markets can be highly organized systems, market 
participants also create alliances and support the regulation of competition, such as market 
entry regulation, to ‘control’ the degree to which a particular player or practice can be 
accepted as legitimate. For instance, the meta-organization ISEAL acts as a ‘competition 
watchdog’ that both controls and promotes the market. By permanently enacting and 
reproducing positions that are ‘entirely relative to the position of other producers in that 
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market’ (White, 1993, p. 164), standards setters, more or less intentionally, co-create a 
competitive market space that allows multiple standards providers to co-exist legitimately.  
However, standards markets differ from conventional markets in that they resemble moral 
exchange arenas, at whose base is ‘a belief in a substantive good or value’ (Biggart & 
Delbridge, 2004, p. 39). Previous research suggests that actors initially cooperate to establish 
and stabilize a collective identity and then, once the market space is established, begin to 
compete more outwardly (Navis & Glynn, 2010). In our case, however, different standards 
setters started as competitors who contested each other’s moral legitimacy, and only 
hesitantly began to foster a collective identity when they recognized their common interest. 
Standards organizations also do not predominantly differentiate and insist on certain positions 
to gain (or defend) market share and generate revenue, but on expressions of value-oriented 
commitment (Hutchens, 2011). For example, it is highly unlikely that Fairtrade will abandon 
its objective to target smallholders or make their premium-price policy ‘optional’ (e.g. by 
introducing a Fairtrade ‘lite’ label) simply to gain market share. Social movement-driven and 
industry-driven standards organizations recognize each other as collaborating partners in the 
sustainability standards movement, thereby building a ‘transnational community’ around a 
collective frame of action (Djelic & Quack, 2010). Competition is embedded in and limited 
by a shared, long-term orientation towards common values. This is why, for example, 
standards organizations respond to increasing certification costs by promoting compatibility 
between partially competing standards to increase the overall acceptance and feasibility of 
certification. 
Contributions to Transnational Governance  
Transnational governance scholars have looked at the proliferation of voluntary standards in 
various fields, but are only beginning to understand the impact of multiple standards for 
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governing transnational arenas (Kolk, 2005; Fransen, 2011; Rasche, 2010). To capture this 
dynamic, we conceptualized parallel standards as competitors in a ‘standards market’ that 
position themselves in dialogue but also in contradistinction. While previous research has 
examined the political struggles among social movements and corporations implicated in the 
creation of voluntary standards, with competing agendas and rival problem definitions 
(Bartley, 2007), our findings illustrate the changing role of social movements in the markets 
which they create. Social movement-driven standards continue to play an important role not 
only as collaborators in industry-driven standards, but also as influential players in the 
process of meta-standardization. We therefore challenge the dichotomous view on standards 
multiplicity as either a ‘source of innovation’ or ‘confusion’ (Bendell, 2005; Fransen, 2011; 
Gilbert et al., 2011), which eventually initiates a ‘race to the bottom’ (Bitzer et al., 2008).  
First, meta-standardization, as an important driver of standards market dynamics, promises a 
regulatory effect on the competitive space. As already noted, standards market participants, 
despite their competing strategies and political aspirations, have a shared interest in standards 
dissemination to promote sustainability. Part of this dynamic is the process of establishing 
common ground on baseline criteria for ‘legitimate standards’, which may counteract the 
often criticized ‘race to the bottom’. Market participants want to secure their roles as 
participants in a legitimate political project and collective movement. By positioning 
themselves as premium standards, social movement-driven standards maintain the bar of 
what is legitimate for industry-driven standards, but collaborate to create enabling 
partnerships and construct joint certification platforms. Rasche (2010) suggests that such 
forms of ‘collaborative governance’ among participants may work to pool resources more 
efficiently, exploit complementarities and strengthen existing collective efforts.  
Second, standards markets can provide possibilities for ‘trading up’ (Vogel, 1995). It is often 
argued that standardization stifles (technical) innovation (Garud, Jain & Kumaraswamy, 
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2002), while competition stimulates experimentation and innovation in certification and 
adoption. Competition among standards may hence encourage continual reassessment of a 
given standard relative to competing standards. Rather than having a single agreed-upon 
standard that defines the new market, standards setters contribute to an ongoing debate about 
how sustainability in coffee production and trade can be translated into concrete practices. 
Mutual observation promotes continuous learning, including the adoption of ‘best practices.’  
Third, standards markets illustrate how private, decentralized actors can collectively expand 
the scale of self-regulation. Alternative, yet partly complementary, standards solutions have 
made certification a legitimate option and even expectation for various industry players. This 
finding is in line with suggestions that competition for solutions to collective action problems 
may encourage the mobilization of supporters (Andrews, 2002; Ingram & Inman, 1996). A 
greater number of market participants may contribute to institutionalizing sustainability 
certification as an expected business practice, as was the case in sustainability reporting 
(Etzion & Ferraro, 2010). 
From a critical perspective, the notion of ‘standards market’ offers a fresh perspective on the 
‘marketization’ of governance in the transnational space (Djelic, 2006). It points to the ways 
in which private market regulation may become influenced by competitive dynamics. 
Standards competition may deepen some of the problems observed with respect to voluntary 
standards, such as corporate capture and short-termism, displacing more integrated 
approaches to systemic sustainability challenges and long-term social empowerment (Levy, 
2008). While meta-standardization establishes common expectations about, for example, a 
particular certification model, industry-dominated schemes may emulate these templates as 
fashionable solutions to divert criticism from their activities (Gulbrandsen, 2008; Khan, 
Munir & Willmott, 2009). Fairtrade, for example, was created to provide a means for 
‘contestation by subordinate groups in complex dynamic social systems’ (Levy & Egan, 
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2003, p. 803) with the goal of reconceptualising power relations in global commodity chains. 
In her ethnographic study of Fairtrade, Reinecke (2010) observes that minimum price setting 
for coffee was significantly influenced by concerns over whether an increase in price would 
result in ‘loss of market’, if coffee roasters and retailers switched to competitors’ labels. Also, 
efforts to cooperate may fail, as Fransen (2011) observed in the garment industry. In the 
coffee industry, cooperation, although increasing, is in its infancy. Given that it is producers 
in the Global South, rather than consumers in the North, who are negatively affected by 
costly certifications and incompatible standards, standards organizations need to do much 
more to re-direct resources away from duplicating administrative and implementation costs of 
(multiple) certifications towards real investment in sustainable development.  
Implications and Directions for Future Research 
Instead of homogeneity and convergence, standards markets show a surprising degree of 
multiplicity and plurality, and continuously evolve and change. Our findings explain why the 
co-existence of multiple sustainability standards might sustain. We propose some general 
conditions for the emergence of standards markets as differentiated competitive spaces. First, 
the absence of an overarching authority, such as a state government or industry association, 
creates a space that allows private actors to become involved in regulation. However, even in 
the case of Organic, the only standard that has been codified into law in many countries, a 
number of different labels continue to co-exist and compete (Lee, 2009). Second, this 
suggests another more general condition for the emergence of standards markets: the 
existence of normative disputes about the object or quality to be standardized. Ideological 
differences in interpretation stimulate competition over conceptual ownership and moral 
authority (Shamir, 2008). For example, multiple standards initiatives have emerged in the 
voluntary carbon offset market, offering competing interpretations of a technically, ethically 
and politically complex commodity (Kollmus, Lazarus, Lee, Lefranc & Polycarp, 2010). 
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Relatedly, conflicting political and strategic interests may encourage newcomers to develop 
alternative standards. In the case of coffee, but also in textiles (Fransen, 2011) and forestry 
(Sasser et al., 2006), firms invest resources in the development of alternative standards, even 
when internationally recognized standards are available. Third, the ability to make standards 
transparent for consumers, e.g. through a product label, makes them strategic objects for 
market positioning. Given this positioning opportunity, multinational roasters typically adopt 
and use different standards certifications to address different regional consumer markets 
(Manning et al., 2011). Fourth, the possibility of modular overlap, e.g. through certification 
platforms, enables competitors to agree on the compatibility of implementation criteria and 
monitoring without completely compromising competition (Besen & Farrell, 1994). This 
encourages multiple adoptions and reduces switching costs on the implementation and the 
front-end marketing sides.  
We cannot determine conclusively whether these conditions are necessary or sufficient for 
the emergence of standards markets. The sustainable coffee sector is a young, growing and 
increasingly fragmented segment that has changed considerably since 2000. An important 
question for further research is to determine to what extent and under what conditions our 
findings are applicable to other arenas.  
Clearly, a comparative study of sustainability standards in sectors, such as in forestry, 
textiles, flowers, fisheries, would be useful to elaborate the conditions under which we might 
expect the emergence of standards markets rather than consolidation to a single standard. 
This should also investigate the role of meta-standardization in ‘organizing’ standards 
markets. Given that many standards setters are active in more than one sector, future cross-
sectoral studies could contribute to a better understanding of the role of standards markets in 
transmitting definitions and practices across sectors. Furthermore, since our focus was on the 
interaction among standards organizations, we do not provide detailed insights into how 
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increased marketization affects the governance and implementation of individual standards. 
Therefore, more research on the (long term) impacts of standards markets is needed. 
Future research could also compare how the field-level dynamics of standards competition 
plays out differently in the context of technical versus social standards. Our findings suggest 
that, in contrast to technical standards where strong positive network effects have been 
observed to explain standardization processes, in our case ideologies, values and normative 
legitimacy may be important factors promoting the emergence of (social) standards markets. 
This finding is based on observations in the global coffee industry, but could have 
implications for the co-existence of parallel standards in other sectors, such as carbon offset, 
corporate responsibility (Jamali, 2010) or parallel MBA accreditations (EQUIS versus 
AACSB; see Durand & McGuire, 2005). 
The literature on technical standards often overlooks the important role of ideology in the 
process of standardization. Ideological factors of competition may be observed in certain 
technological standards, e.g. open source software such as the LINUX operating system. 
Here, the preservation of an ‘open standard’ reflects a ‘copyleft’ philosophy, which expresses 
a political stance against the copyright ideology (Mustonen, 2003). That is, the social and the 
technical may be more intertwined than the technology management literature suggests and 
we need to pay more attention to how technology construction grows out of the 
‘sociopolitical process of compromise’ involving ideologies, norms and values (Hargrave & 
Van de Ven, 2006, p. 877; Bijker, Hughes & Pinch, 1987). 
Conclusion 
The central construct of this study, standards markets, offers a novel and, we hope, 
provocative way of thinking about transnational governance arrangements where co-existing 
voluntary standards ‘offer’ different regulatory solutions. These competitive fields are 
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increasingly important forms of private market regulation that addresses global issues and 
may transform business practice, while also providing new challenges for standards setters, 
industry players and policy-makers. One challenge is that standards markets turn the 
contentious political struggle over the meaning of sustainability and the distribution of power 
in global value chains into a competitive struggle for market share. While driving market 
growth, social movements, such as Fairtrade, become implicated in the competitive logic they 
initially contested and struggle to challenge unsustainable and inequitable growth patterns on 
a more systemic level. 
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 Tables & Figures  
Table 1: Comparison of major sustainability standards in the coffee industry 
 Third-Party Sustainability Programmes Corporate Programmes Sector 
initiative 
 
 
Fairtrade  
Certified 
SAN/Rainfor
est Alliance 
Certified 
SMBC ‘Bird 
friendly’ 
UTZ 
Certified  
Nespresso 
AAA 
Sustainable 
Quality 
Starbucks 
C.A.F.E. 
(Coffee and 
Farmer 
Equity) 
Practices 
The Common 
Code for the 
Coffee 
Community 
(4C) 
Main 
objective 
Focus on 
development/ 
poverty 
alleviation. 
Guaranteed 
minimum 
price and 
premium.  
 
Improve 
environmental 
and social 
conditions in 
tropical 
agriculture. 
Focus on 
conservation 
/biodiversity.   
Preserve the 
habitat of 
migratory 
songbirds.  
Organic 
shade-grown 
coffee. 
 
Create 
transparency 
along the 
supply chain 
and reward 
responsible 
coffee 
producers. 
Source 
sustainable 
highest quality 
coffee in a 
way that is 
respectful of 
the 
environment 
and farming 
communities. 
Good social 
and 
environmental 
performance 
minimizing 
negative 
environmental 
impact. 
Provides a 
step up 
standard from 
the 
sustainability 
baseline to 
more 
demanding 
standards.  
Certified 
coffee sales / 
supply (in 
2009) 
73,781/ 
165.000 MT 
About  
87,583/ 
124.000  MT 
About 3,000 
MT 
82,058 / 
308,000 MT 
13,000 
/13,000  
MT (2008) 
135,910 / 
135,910 MT 
29,520 
/270.000  MT 
Launch  1988 (Max 
Havelaar/NL) 
1987 (Coffee: 
1995) 
1996/7 1997 2003 2004 2006 
Initiator  Social 
Movement/ 
NGO 
Social 
Movement/ 
Researchers/N
GO 
The 
Smithsonian 
Migratory 
Bird Center 
(Research 
Institute) 
Firm (Ahold 
Coffee-NL) in 
cooperation 
with 
Guatemalan 
coffee 
supplier  
Firm (Nestlé-
CH) 
Firm 
(Starbucks-
US) 
Government/ 
Industry 
(Kraft Foods -
Jacobs Kaffee, 
Nestlé/ 
German 
development 
agency GTZ) 
Price 
premium  
US1.40 + 0.2 
per pound for 
Arabica in 
2011 
 
Flexible. Flexible. 
Organic 
premium. 
Flexible, at 
least US$0.01  
per pound. 
Average 
premium for 
Arabica 
US$0.057 per 
pound in 2009 
Flexible. 
Premium 
segment. 
Average 
premium 35% 
above New 
York market / 
‘Real Farmer 
Income’ 
Flexible. 
Premium 
segment. 
Average  
US$1.47 per 
pound in 2009 
Flexible. 
Market 
Conditions. 
Label (% of 
certified 
ingredient) 
Yes (100%) Yes (at least 
30%) 
Yes (100%) Yes (100%) Business-to-
business 
 ‘Starbucks 
Shared Planet’ 
(100%) 
Business-to-
business 
ISEAL 
Membership 
Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
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Table 2: Standards Differentiation 
 
Standards Differentiation 
‘All these certification schemes have a kind of common ground, 60, 70, 80%... but they have these 
other 20% that is different.’ (Coffee Industry) 
Standard/ 
Principle of 
differentiation 
Emphasis on distinctive 
features of sustainability  
Different target groups  Different ‘levels’ of 
stringency  
Fairtrade 
Fixed price premium & 
‘social justice’ movement 
Narrow: Small-scale 
producers only   
High: Premium for 
social and economic 
aspects. 
Third party certification, 
ISO65 accredited. 
SMBC Bird 
Friendly 
Song birds & organic 
shade-grown coffee 
Narrow: Organic + shade-
grown coffee producers 
only 
High: Premium for 
environmental aspects. 
Third party (Organic) 
certification.  
SAN/Rainforest 
Alliance 
Biodiversity conservation 
& ‘green' movement 
Midrange: Big and 
medium sized estates of 
shade-grown coffee 
producers only 
High: Premium for 
environmental aspects. 
Third party certification. 
ISO 65 accreditation 
planned. 
UTZ Certified 
Transparency in supply 
chain & responsible 
production 
Broad: Producers of all 
sizes and production 
types  
Medium across pillars. 
Third party certification, 
ISO65 accredited. 
Starbucks’ 
C.A.F.É. 
Practices 
High coffee quality that is 
sustainably grown 
Narrow: High-quality, 
Starbucks only coffee 
growers 
Medium across pillars. 
Third-party 
VERification 
Nespresso AAA 
Sustainable 
Quality 
Superior coffee quality that 
is sustainably grown 
Narrow: High-quality, 
Nespresso only coffee 
growers 
Medium across pillars. 
Third-party 
VERification 
4C 
Baseline standard with 
step-up 
Broad: Producers of all 
sizes and production 
types 
Low: Baseline across all 
pillars. 
Third-party 
VERification 
 
Different interests of 
standards promoters 
‘Standards with strong 
NGO involvement have 
stronger ethical goals.... 
Corporate standards are 
following a business 
agenda. They aim to 
occupy another segment in 
the market.’ (Development 
Agency) 
Historical identity as 
‘unique selling point’ 
Market segmentation  
 ‘I see the big standards 
going for market share.’ 
(Producer) 
‘Labels like Fairtrade 
work better as niche 
standards.’ (Coffee 
Industry) 
‘Someone needs to be the 
innovator and cutting 
edge. …I think we 
shouldn't be Microsoft, 
but Apple. We should not 
Baseline standard as a 
step-up 
‘Multiple standards do 
make sense when you 
can build on one 
standard and from there 
take a step onto the next. 
I think 4C works as a 
good basis for “step-
up”.’ (Consulting) 
Positioning as 
premium standard 
‘Compared with other 
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‘But why is this market 
there? Because 50 years 
ago it was started by 
idealists…’ (FLO)  
 
aim at taking over the 
whole market, but be the 
innovative one.’ (FLO) 
ethical certification 
schemes…I believe that 
we have higher 
standards, and that’s the 
difference.’ (FLO) 
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Table 3: Standards Convergence 
 
Standards Convergence  
‘On paper, standards all look the same’ (Rainforest Alliance) 
Emergence of a 
common vocabulary 
Creation of shared 
certification platforms 
Adoption of industry-
level codes of good 
practice 
Adoption of the triple bottom 
line 
• Environmental 
sustainability 
• Social sustainability 
• Economic sustainability 
  
Learning effects 
‘Standards are based on 
other standards; some 
parts seem to be adopted 
from other standards.… 
It’s a bit like a self-
referring system.’ 
(Coffee Industry) 
Social pressures 
‘Then you also have 
social pressure between 
standards. They 
influence each other and 
if a critical mass 
addresses an issue, you 
can be sure that their 
competitors will react in 
doing the same.’ 
(Consulting) 
Dual labeling & Harmonizing 
certification  
• Dual certification audits 
• Endorsement of other 
standards (elements) as 
equivalent 
 
Promoting compatibility 
of standards elements 
‘Benchmarking building 
blocks need to be 
identified that are 
compatible.’ (Coffee 
Industry) 
Efficiency for producers 
‘In order to create more 
efficiencies and clarity for 
producers, Fairtrade, 
SAN/Rainforest Alliance 
and UTZ CERTIFIED are 
working together to reduce 
the level of complexity 
and costs for farmers. …. 
We share a commitment to 
independent third party 
certification.’ (SAN, 2011) 
ISO 65 Accreditation 
• Certification of certifiers 
‘We now have a new level 
of accountability that comes 
in the form of ISEAL…that 
is the “certification of the 
certifiers”’ (SAN/Rainforest 
Alliance) 
 
ISEAL Codes of Good Practice  
• Credible Standard-Setting 
Processes 
• Credible Impacts Assessment 
 
Strengthening credibility 
‘ISEAL is very important to 
strengthen your credibility 
when you can say I am 
complying with this code.’ 
(FLO) 
Enabling harmonization 
‘ISEAL is promoting 
collaboration and working 
on harmonization.’ 
(Development Agency) 
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Figure 1: Sustainability standards and certified coffee sales  
 
 
 
Source: Respective standards organizations; Giovannucci & Pierrot (2010) 
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Figure 2: Two Countervailing Mechanisms in the Constitution of Standards Markets 
 
  
 
